newsletter-curation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to fetch content from external search engines (Tavily, Exa) to curate newsletter items. This process ingests untrusted third-party data that could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's commentary or social media generation.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdreferences the use oftavily/search-assistantandexa/searchto gather industry news and trending discussions. - Capability inventory: The agent uses the gathered data to generate summaries, write editorial commentary, and create social media posts via
x/post-create. - Boundary markers: The provided templates do not include specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the search results.
- Sanitization: There are no explicit steps for sanitizing or filtering external content before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
beltCLI tool to run various applications for content discovery, image generation, and social media posting. Theallowed-toolsconfiguration specifically enables shell access for these tasks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation points to external GitHub resources for installation guides and additional skill dependencies within the
inference.shecosystem.
Audit Metadata