newsletter-curation

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to fetch content from external search engines (Tavily, Exa) to curate newsletter items. This process ingests untrusted third-party data that could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's commentary or social media generation.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md references the use of tavily/search-assistant and exa/search to gather industry news and trending discussions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent uses the gathered data to generate summaries, write editorial commentary, and create social media posts via x/post-create.
  • Boundary markers: The provided templates do not include specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the search results.
  • Sanitization: There are no explicit steps for sanitizing or filtering external content before it is processed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the belt CLI tool to run various applications for content discovery, image generation, and social media posting. The allowed-tools configuration specifically enables shell access for these tasks.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation points to external GitHub resources for installation guides and additional skill dependencies within the inference.sh ecosystem.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 2, 2026, 02:20 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — newsletter-curation