adanwo
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external workloads and task-based artifacts for evaluation, which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via representative workloads, experimental questions, and candidate artifacts defined in SKILL.md and references/measured-experiment.md.
- Boundary markers: The provided instructions do not define explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the experimental data.
- Capability inventory: The skill documentation references executing subprocesses, interactions, and tool calls to measure candidate performance (references/measured-experiment.md).
- Sanitization: There is no explicit requirement for escaping or filtering external content before interpolation into the agent's context.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the creation and runtime execution of experimental code and prototypes.
- Evidence: references/exploration.md guides the building of 'truthfully exercisable' representations and 'runnable interactions' to settle uncertainties. references/measured-experiment.md details the execution of 'comparative trials' against baseline and candidate variants.
Audit Metadata