ml
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
MLEngineclass inml_engine.pyincludes a model registry system that facilitates saving and loading models. The methodssave_to_registryandload_from_registryusenamespaceandmodel_idparameters to build filesystem paths. Because these parameters are not sanitized to prevent path traversal characters (such as../), they could be exploited to access, expose, or overwrite files outside the intended data directories. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
MLEngineandModelPredictorclasses inml_engine.pycall PyCaret'sload_modelfunction to restore trained states. PyCaret typically utilizes thepickleserialization format, which is insecure when loading data from untrusted sources. A maliciously crafted model file could execute arbitrary commands on the system when it is loaded by the skill. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests large datasets and generates metadata files in JSON format, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. If the data being processed or the metadata being saved is influenced by an untrusted source, it could contain instructions designed to manipulate the agent's behavior in later steps of a workflow.
- Ingestion points: Training dataframes passed to
MLEngine.setup_and_trainand factor data inMLFactorEngine(ml_factor.py). - Boundary markers: None; the skill assumes the integrity of the dataframes it receives for processing.
- Capability inventory: Filesystem read and write capabilities via the model registry methods in
ml_engine.py. - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the data content or the metadata fields before they are serialized to the filesystem.
Audit Metadata