skills/quantskills/skill-factormad-debate-factor-mining/factormad-debate-factor-mining/Gen Agent Trust Hub
factormad-debate-factor-mining
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
exec()inscripts/factormad_runtime/factormad_compute_runtime.pyandeval()inscripts/factormad_runtime/alpha_ops.pyto execute Python code generated by a Large Language Model (LLM). Although the skill implements a keyword-based filter (_factor_namespace) to block imports and dangerous modules likeosorsubprocess, the execution of dynamically generated code is inherently risky as these heuristic checks can potentially be bypassed. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The workflow incorporates untrusted external inputs—such as column names from market data CSVs and user-defined factor requirements—directly into the LLM prompts. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious input could coerce the LLM into generating factor code designed to evade security checks or perform unauthorized actions. * Ingestion points:
market_data_csv_pathandfactor_requirementfields in the input JSON, processed infactormad_compute_runtime.py. * Boundary markers: The skill uses JSON-structured prompts but lacks strong delimiters or specialized 'ignore instructions' wrappers for all user-controlled variables. * Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute Python code viaexec()andeval()across multiple runtime scripts. * Sanitization: Heuristic keyword filtering is performed in_factor_namespaceto detect and block common attack vectors likeimport,os., andsubprocess.
Audit Metadata