The Agent Skills Directory

[REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to execute code provided by external contributors in pull requests.
Evidence: In SKILL.md under "Verify the claim", the instruction states: "For a PR, confirm the diff does what it claims — check it out, run the relevant tests or commands."
[DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill involves the runtime execution of code changes contained within pull request diffs.
Evidence: The verification step requires checking out and running potentially arbitrary code submitted via external PRs.
[COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands to interact with the environment and project tooling.
Evidence: The instructions refer to running /setup-quirk-skills, /grilling, and /domain-modeling, as well as executing arbitrary tests or commands for verification purposes.
[INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from an external issue tracker which could contain malicious instructions.
Ingestion points: SKILL.md (Step 1: Gather context) instructs the agent to "Read the full issue or PR (body, comments, labels, author, dates; for a PR, the diff too)."
Boundary markers: The skill does not define clear delimiters or "ignore" instructions for processing this external text, although it adds an AI-generated disclaimer to its own output comments.
Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to read and write files (specifically in .out-of-scope/), post comments to the tracker, and execute commands.
Sanitization: There is no explicit requirement to sanitize or escape the content ingested from issues/PRs before it influences the agent's logic or brief generation.
[METADATA_POISONING]: There is a contradiction between the skill's declared capabilities and its actual instructions.
Evidence: The YAML frontmatter in SKILL.md states sideEffects: [], yet the skill body explicitly directs the agent to write files to the .out-of-scope/ directory and post comments to the issue tracker.

triage