java-decompile
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The implementation instructions direct the agent to use
$ARGUMENTS(user input) within shell command templates. Specifically, the patterns in Step 2 (e.g.,grep -q "com/example/ClassName.class") and the use offindandjarcommands do not include explicit sanitization or quoting of the class name variable. This could allow for command injection if a user provides a class name containing shell metacharacters like;,&, or backticks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes
jbangto retrieve and execute the Vineflower decompiler (org.vineflower:vineflower:RELEASE). This process fetches code from Maven Central, a well-known repository for Java artifacts, to facilitate the decompilation process. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The skill reads and displays source code decompiled from project dependencies (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific guidance for the agent to treat the decompiled output as untrusted data or to ignore any instructions found within the code comments or logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands via
mvn,jbang,find,jar, andrm(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or escaping the decompiled source code before it is presented to the agent's context.
Audit Metadata