ultracite
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface where instructions embedded in project data could influence the agent.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads project-specific configuration files including
biome.json,eslint.config.*,oxlint.config.ts, andpackage.json(documented in SETUP-AND-MIGRATION.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when reading configuration data.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute subprocesses via
bunx,npx,pnpm, andyarn, and performs filesystem mutations usingultracite fix,init, andupgradecommands (documented in SETUP-AND-MIGRATION.md). - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the content read from these external configuration files before they are processed by the tool or agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to run various shell commands using
bunx,npx,pnpm exec, andyarnto perform environment diagnostics, apply code fixes, and initialize configurations. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions involve fetching external packages at runtime from remote registries, specifically using the
npx ultracite@latest upgradecommand to obtain the latest version of the toolset. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
upgradeworkflow involves the dynamic download and execution of a remote CLI tool, which is a common but sensitive operation for maintaining toolchains.
Audit Metadata