skills/quegenx/agent-skills/ultracite/Gen Agent Trust Hub

ultracite

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface where instructions embedded in project data could influence the agent.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads project-specific configuration files including biome.json, eslint.config.*, oxlint.config.ts, and package.json (documented in SETUP-AND-MIGRATION.md).
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when reading configuration data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute subprocesses via bunx, npx, pnpm, and yarn, and performs filesystem mutations using ultracite fix, init, and upgrade commands (documented in SETUP-AND-MIGRATION.md).
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the content read from these external configuration files before they are processed by the tool or agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to run various shell commands using bunx, npx, pnpm exec, and yarn to perform environment diagnostics, apply code fixes, and initialize configurations.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions involve fetching external packages at runtime from remote registries, specifically using the npx ultracite@latest upgrade command to obtain the latest version of the toolset.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The upgrade workflow involves the dynamic download and execution of a remote CLI tool, which is a common but sensitive operation for maintaining toolchains.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 23, 2026, 11:52 PM