mcp-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes functionality to launch and interact with local MCP servers.
- Evidence:
scripts/connections.pyutilizes thestdio_clientfrom themcplibrary, which spawns subprocesses based on user-provided commands and arguments (e.g.,python server.py). This is a core requirement for testing locally developed MCP servers. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions direct the agent to fetch documentation and SDK information from external sources to ensure the latest protocol standards are followed.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdfetches content frommodelcontextprotocol.ioand the officialmodelcontextprotocolorganization on GitHub. These are well-known, trusted sources for this specific technology domain. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The evaluation script processes outputs from external tools, which represents a potential attack surface if those tools return malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/evaluation.py(viatool_result = await connection.call_tool(...)) andSKILL.md(via documentation fetching). - Boundary markers: The
EVALUATION_PROMPTinscripts/evaluation.pyuses XML-style tags (<summary>,<feedback>,<response>) to structure the agent's response, providing some separation from tool outputs. - Capability inventory: The skill can execute local commands (via
stdiotransport), perform network requests (via SSE/HTTP transports), and interact with the Anthropic API. - Sanitization: The evaluation script directly serializes tool outputs into the message history without explicit instruction-filtering, though it relies on the model's inherent ability to distinguish between tool results and user instructions.
Audit Metadata