comfy-videogen
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied text prompts and media inputs (images, audio, video) which are passed as arguments to video generation models and text encoders, such as Gemma 3.1 and UMT5 XXL. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in the input could attempt to bypass safety filters or influence model behavior.
- Ingestion points: The
--prompt,--input,--audio, and--first/--lastarguments incomfy-videogenCLI commands. - Boundary markers: The provided command examples do not use specific delimiters or protective instructions to isolate user-provided prompts from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes local shell commands, performs file system writes to the
outputsdirectory, and interacts with remote video generation APIs. - Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions for the agent to sanitize or validate the content of user-provided prompts before execution.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions involve the download of external AI model weights to the local environment, which is necessary for model inference.
- Evidence: The skill notes that
SeedVR2upscaling "auto-downloads its own model files" (DiT/VAE weights) when they are not present. - Evidence: The skill utilizes
comfy-model-downloaderto fetch local model files for various generation modes to the/mnt/models/comfyuidirectory.
Audit Metadata