Nested object argument construction
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFE
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions in
SKILL.md,rules.md, andsolver_rules.mdfocus exclusively on logical parameter construction and tool-call routing. There are no attempts to bypass safety filters, override system instructions, or extract restricted information. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: No hardcoded credentials, API keys, or sensitive file paths (e.g.,
.env,.ssh,.aws) were found. The skill does not perform network operations (e.g.,curl,fetch) that could be used for data exfiltration. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: There are no patterns involving the download and execution of remote scripts. The Python file
validator.pyis a local script that performs structural checks on tool output. - [OBFUSCATION]: The content was analyzed for Base64 encoding, zero-width characters, homoglyphs, and hidden text patterns. All content is in plain, human-readable text.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a potential surface for indirect injection as
validator.pyprocesses untrusted dialogue data from asampleobject. However, the analysis shows no risk because the validator only performs type checking (isinstance) and dictionary key validation. - Ingestion points:
validator.pyprocessessample.get("system")and tool call parameters. - Boundary markers: None present.
- Capability inventory: No file writing, network operations, or subprocess execution capabilities are present in any script.
- Sanitization: Absent, but unnecessary given the safe, structural-only processing logic.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]:
validator.pydoes not useeval(),exec(), or any dynamic loading mechanisms that would allow for arbitrary code execution. It uses standard logical comparisons and type checks. - [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]:
SKILL.mddoes not contain any!commandplaceholders or shell execution patterns.
Audit Metadata