cua-driver
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides commands to download and execute installation scripts for the
qwen-cua-drivertool from the author's official GitHub repository (QwenLM/qwen-code). These patterns include/bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL ...)"andirm ... | iexfor Windows. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill documents management commands for the
qwen-cua-driverCLI (qwen-cua-driver autostart enable) that allow the user to register a Windows Scheduled Task to automatically start the driver daemon upon interactive logon. Similar capabilities for systemd units are mentioned for Linux. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from GUI accessibility trees, screen contents, and web pages.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through GUI metadata (accessibility trees) and screenshots processed in
SKILL.mdandBROWSER.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define strict delimiters for this data, though
SKILL.mdexplicitly warns the agent to treat all application-provided text and labels as untrusted. - Capability inventory: The skill has high-privilege capabilities including simulated user input (keyboard/mouse) and filesystem mutation, implemented via subprocess calls to the
qwen-cua-driverbinary. - Sanitization: There is no automated sanitization of external content, placing the responsibility for safe interpretation on the agent's internal logic.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill operates by executing the
qwen-cua-driverCLI tool through shell commands to perform GUI automation tasks, including application launching, window state inspection, and input delivery.
Audit Metadata