qwen-mm-plugins-core
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted external data in a wide variety of formats (e.g., PDF, Office documents, HTML, LaTeX, and Jupyter Notebooks) via the
visualizeandread_videotools. This represents a significant attack surface where maliciously crafted files could contain instructions designed to influence or override agent behavior. - Ingestion points: Local files processed by the
visualize,read_image, andread_videotools defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or safety prompts advising the agent to treat data returned by these tools as untrusted.
- Capability inventory: The tools provide extensive file reading, metadata extraction, rendering, and manipulation capabilities.
- Sanitization: The provided documentation does not specify the use of sanitization or validation logic for the content extracted from external files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
visualizetool depends on external system utilities to process specific file types, such aslibreofficefor Office documents,playwrightfor web page screenshots, andblenderfor 3D models. Additionally, LaTeX support involves the compilation of.texfiles, which traditionally requires invoking system-level typesetting engines. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation identifies several external software requirements and dependencies, including
libreoffice,playwright,blender,pypdfium2, andresvg, which are necessary for the visualization of various document and media formats.
Audit Metadata