qwen-mm-plugins-omni-chatcut-video-translation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from source videos (speech, subtitles, OCR) via the
omni_calltool to generate dubbing plans and translations. - Ingestion points:
omni_callresults inworkflows/source-analysis/WORKFLOW.md. - Boundary markers: No specific markers are defined to isolate untrusted video content from agent instructions in the analyzed files.
- Capability inventory: File system write operations, network requests to the dubbing service, and media rendering tools.
- Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization for the transcript or OCR text before it is used in the authoring pipeline.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The reference server implementation (
references/launch_dubbing_server.py) usessubprocess.runto execute external binaries likeffmpeganddemucsfor audio manipulation and separation. While these are used for legitimate media processing, they represent a vector for command injection if input paths or parameters were improperly handled. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits project audio data (in base64 format) to an external service URL defined by the environment variable
QWEN_MM_DUBBING_SERVER_URL. While this is necessary for the skill's purpose (using external GPUs for TTS/VAD/Separation), it facilitates the movement of potentially sensitive user media to a remote endpoint.
Audit Metadata