skills/raddue/crucible/inquisitor/Gen Agent Trust Hub

inquisitor

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 23, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's core workflow involves subagents that write and execute arbitrary test scripts on the host system to verify feature implementation. Additionally, a 'Fixer' cycle allows the agent to modify production source code and re-run tests. Executing dynamically generated code or automatically applying code changes introduces significant risks if the generation process is influenced by malicious input or encounters unexpected behavior.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from 'git diff' outputs and interpolates this content directly into instructions for subagents that possess powerful file-system and execution capabilities. Malicious code comments or strings within a feature diff could potentially override agent instructions.
  • Ingestion points: The full feature diff computed via git diff is interpolated into the inquisitor-prompt.md template used for subagent dispatch.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt template lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to treat the diff content as untrusted data or to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can write files (tests and production code fixes), execute shell commands (git and test runners), and utilize external model reviews.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the diff content is performed before processing.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell command execution to determine the state of the repository, specifically using git diff and git merge-base to calculate the analysis scope. It also likely executes a test runner to process the generated adversarial tests.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 23, 2026, 03:28 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — inquisitor