blacksmith-orchestrate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted content from external sources, including GitHub/GitLab issues, Jira tickets, Linear issues, and free-form implementation goals provided as prose. This content is interpolated into instructions for sub-agents during the 'Scout' phase in
scripts/scout-fanout.mjs(e.g.,${t.ref}and${t.hint}). Maliciously crafted ticket descriptions could attempt to influence the sub-agent's behavior or poison the structured analysis returned to the orchestrator. - Ingestion points: Issue/ticket descriptions fetched from trackers, user-provided goal strings in the command invocation.
- Boundary markers: The skill uses a structured JSON schema (
SCOUT_SCHEMA) to validate sub-agent output, reducing the impact of unstructured injections, though it does not fully prevent them. - Capability inventory: The sub-agents can perform file analysis; the orchestrator can write files, create worktrees, and perform PR operations (
git,gh,glab). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of interpolated ticket data is mentioned in the prompt construction.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of system commands for repository management. It utilizes
git worktreefor environment isolation, and GitHub/GitLab CLI tools (gh,glab) for pull request lifecycle management. These commands are integral to the stated purpose of the skill and operate within the user's authenticated scope. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill maintains execution state by writing a ledger file to the repository's
.gitdirectory (.git/blacksmith/run-<id>.json). This mechanism ensures that orchestration runs can be resumed after interruption and prevents duplicate work by tracking the state of each task (provisioned, running, pr-open, etc.).
Audit Metadata