skills/radimsem/keek/keek-setup/Gen Agent Trust Hub

keek-setup

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill requires the agent to read external, untrusted content from the repository (README, lockfiles, scripts, etc.) to determine the project's setup and startup commands. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions in the repository files could influence the agent's profile generation.
  • Ingestion points: package.json, README.md, Makefile, .env.example, and various lockfiles (e.g., package-lock.json, Cargo.lock) within the target repository.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are provided to the agent to distinguish between trusted instructions and data from the repository.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses set_project_profile to write configuration and prepare_project to execute shell commands in a sandbox environment. It also modifies repository files like AGENTS.md or CLAUDE.md.
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation or sanitization steps for the data extracted from repository files before it is used to construct shell commands.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of arbitrary shell commands through the install and start fields in the project profile. While these commands are executed within a sandbox that resets the environment after build, the skill provides the mechanism for their definition and execution based on repository content.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 14, 2026, 05:06 PM