orchestrate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and synthesize information from potentially untrusted external sources, which could be used to manipulate the instructions passed to sub-agents.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md describes gathering evidence from repository exploration, production logs, Sentry excerpts, and multi-source research.
  • Boundary markers: The skill encourages isolation through "Assignment Contracts" and the use of fork_turns: "none" to minimize inherited context, though it lacks explicit guidance on sanitizing these inputs for adversarial content.
  • Capability inventory: The orchestrator utilizes spawn_agent to delegate tasks that include code implementation (Implementation leaf), repository modification, and workflow execution.
  • Sanitization: No specific mechanisms are defined for sanitizing or escaping content from logs or external research before it is used to define sub-agent objectives.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill defines personas and workflows that involve the execution and monitoring of shell commands and CI processes.
  • Evidence: The Workflow operator persona is explicitly tasked with running "user-authorized workflows" and monitoring "deterministic exports."
  • Evidence: The Evidence scout persona is instructed to return "commands, timestamps, and exact failures" derived from system health checks and log excerpts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 12, 2026, 02:24 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — orchestrate