orchestrate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and synthesize information from potentially untrusted external sources, which could be used to manipulate the instructions passed to sub-agents.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mddescribes gathering evidence from repository exploration, production logs, Sentry excerpts, and multi-source research. - Boundary markers: The skill encourages isolation through "Assignment Contracts" and the use of
fork_turns: "none"to minimize inherited context, though it lacks explicit guidance on sanitizing these inputs for adversarial content. - Capability inventory: The orchestrator utilizes
spawn_agentto delegate tasks that include code implementation (Implementation leaf), repository modification, and workflow execution. - Sanitization: No specific mechanisms are defined for sanitizing or escaping content from logs or external research before it is used to define sub-agent objectives.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill defines personas and workflows that involve the execution and monitoring of shell commands and CI processes.
- Evidence: The
Workflow operatorpersona is explicitly tasked with running "user-authorized workflows" and monitoring "deterministic exports." - Evidence: The
Evidence scoutpersona is instructed to return "commands, timestamps, and exact failures" derived from system health checks and log excerpts.
Audit Metadata