skills/railly/vcut/core/Gen Agent Trust Hub

core

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external media files and transcription data (SRT files) to determine edit points. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions embedded in the audio or resulting transcript could attempt to manipulate the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: media files (mp4, wav), transcript files (SRT).
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly describe the use of delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within transcripts.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to vcut commands, EDL building, and rendering tools, which involve significant file system operations.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of transcript content for malicious command strings is mentioned.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation and accompanying Python script describe a setup process (vcut setup classifier) that downloads a 320MB machine learning model into the ~/.vcut/panns directory. While this is part of the core functionality, it represents an external binary dependency.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses subprocess.run in the scripts/non-speech.py utility to call ffmpeg for audio processing. The command is constructed using a list of arguments, which mitigates simple shell injection risks. The skill also utilizes various vcut subcommands to manage video editing sessions and renders.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 29, 2026, 02:19 PM