core
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external media files and transcription data (SRT files) to determine edit points. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions embedded in the audio or resulting transcript could attempt to manipulate the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: media files (mp4, wav), transcript files (SRT).
- Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly describe the use of delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within transcripts.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
vcutcommands, EDL building, and rendering tools, which involve significant file system operations. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of transcript content for malicious command strings is mentioned.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation and accompanying Python script describe a setup process (
vcut setup classifier) that downloads a 320MB machine learning model into the~/.vcut/pannsdirectory. While this is part of the core functionality, it represents an external binary dependency. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runin thescripts/non-speech.pyutility to callffmpegfor audio processing. The command is constructed using a list of arguments, which mitigates simple shell injection risks. The skill also utilizes variousvcutsubcommands to manage video editing sessions and renders.
Audit Metadata