rarv-cycles
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 21, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Instructions explicitly override standard AI agent safety protocols by directing the agent to bypass human confirmation and oversight.
- Evidence: "You are an autonomous agent. You make decisions. You do not ask questions."
- Evidence: "RARV replaces request-confirm-wait loops with a self-correcting cycle that only surfaces to humans when genuinely blocked."
- Evidence: "Agents reason, act, reflect, and verify — without asking humans for permission."
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill grants the agent broad authority to execute arbitrary shell commands and generate code without a human-in-the-loop checkpoint.
- Evidence: "ACT → Execute the plan. Write code. Run commands. Commit changes."
- Evidence: "INFRASTRUCTURE → set up DB, env, Docker, CI."
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The agent is instructed to automatically install software dependencies, which could lead to supply chain attacks if the agent's plan is influenced by malicious input.
- Evidence: "BOOTSTRAP → environment check, dependency install."
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Vulnerability to indirect prompt injection due to the combination of high-privilege capabilities and the ingestion of untrusted external requirements.
- Ingestion points: The
DISCOVERYphase involves reading external specifications and requirements files. - Boundary markers: None are specified to protect the agent from instructions embedded within the requirements files.
- Capability inventory: The agent has full access to run commands, write code, manage environment infrastructure, and perform git commits.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is defined for the external data being processed.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata