colab-cli-authentication

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill interacts with sensitive credential storage paths on the local filesystem. While necessary for managing the authentication lifecycle, these paths are sensitive targets.
  • References and manipulates the Colab CLI token file at ~/.config/colab-cli/token.json (SKILL.md, references/visible-auth-sidepanel.md).
  • References the Google Cloud Application Default Credentials (ADC) file at ~/.config/gcloud/application_default_credentials.json (SKILL.md, references/oauth-pkce-recovery.md).
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external authentication data.
  • Ingestion points: OAuth2 authorization codes provided by the user and authorization URLs generated by the CLI (SKILL.md, references/oauth-pkce-recovery.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define specific delimiters or warnings to isolate these external inputs from the agent's instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Execution of shell commands via the colab CLI and file deletion using rm (SKILL.md, references/visible-auth-sidepanel.md).
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no mention of validating or escaping the authorization code before it is passed to the terminal process.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to manage and verify authentication states.
  • Executes colab subcommands such as whoami, sessions, and version (SKILL.md).
  • Executes rm -f to delete locally cached tokens during logout procedures (references/visible-auth-sidepanel.md).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 28, 2026, 01:10 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — colab-cli-authentication