debugging-by-constraints

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process potentially untrusted data from multiple sources, including bug reports, application logs, and PR comments.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through bug reports (SKILL.md Step 0.1), log queries, metric snapshots, and traces (SKILL.md Step 0.4 and LAYERS.md).
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions to use delimiters or ignore embedded commands within the processed data, increasing the risk that malicious instructions in logs could be followed.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to generate and execute throwaway scripts (SKILL.md Step 0.4), interact with Kubernetes (kubectl), execute system-level debugging tools like tcpdump and strace (LAYERS.md), and modify code (SKILL.md Step 4).
  • Sanitization: While the skill mandates the redaction of secrets, it does not specify sanitization or validation of the content of logs or reports to prevent instruction injection.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to create and run custom scripts.
  • Evidence: Step 0.4 in SKILL.md directs the agent: "When no tool reaches a fact, write a throwaway script to gather or count it". This allows for the runtime generation and execution of code based on the agent's current understanding of the debugging task.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a wide array of powerful system and infrastructure management tools.
  • Evidence: LAYERS.md lists tools such as kubectl, tcpdump, strace, lsof, and py-spy. Misuse of these tools, potentially triggered by indirect injection, could lead to unauthorized system observation or disruption, though the skill includes "Guardrails" to mitigate destructive actions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 27, 2026, 09:07 AM