herdr-goal
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to launch multiple sub-agents using the
--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag. This flag is designed to bypass the standard human-in-the-loop confirmation prompts for tool usage within the agent environment, granting the sub-agents full autonomy to modify files and execute commands without user review. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Under the 'Learn — update this skill' section, the agent is instructed to modify its own
SKILL.mdfile after completing tasks. This creates a self-modification loop where the agent updates its own rules and logic based on its observations, which could be used to persist unintended or malicious instructions across future sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The orchestrator agent processes summaries and status reports from sub-agents, creating a vulnerability surface where a compromised sub-agent could influence the orchestrator's behavior through its output.
- Ingestion points: The orchestrator reads sub-agent transcripts using
herdr pane read <pane-id> --source recent-unwrapped --lines 200to extract summaries. - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or schema validations are defined to isolate the sub-agent's summary from the orchestrator's logic.
- Capability inventory: The orchestrator possesses the capability to execute shell commands, manage git repositories via worktrees, and perform arbitrary file system writes.
- Sanitization: There is no sanitization or verification of the information received from sub-agents before it is used to guide the orchestrator's next actions.
Audit Metadata