skills/ramarivera/coding-buddy/buddy/Gen Agent Trust Hub

buddy

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The diagnostic procedure uses the find command to search for an executable script (mcp-launcher.sh) within a plugin cache directory and then executes it via a dynamically computed path. This represents a risk where the agent might execute a script discovered at runtime rather than from a pre-defined path.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to the user to install the Bun runtime using a piped-to-shell command (curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash). While this targets a well-known service, the installation pattern involves executing a remote script directly.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The uninstall feature utilizes the Bash tool to perform several system-level actions, including the removal of plugin directories via rm -rf. While intended for cleanup, this demonstrates the skill's ability to perform significant file system modifications.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests results from external MCP tools and is commanded to display them verbatim, bypassing typical agent summarization. This creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the tool output contains malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Results from mcp__claude_buddy__* tools (found in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None; the skill explicitly forbids paraphrasing or altering the tool output.
  • Capability inventory: Access to the Bash tool for file system operations and command execution (found in SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: None; raw tool output is relayed to the user.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://bun.sh/install - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 1, 2026, 01:52 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — buddy