buddy
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The diagnostic procedure uses the
findcommand to search for an executable script (mcp-launcher.sh) within a plugin cache directory and then executes it via a dynamically computed path. This represents a risk where the agent might execute a script discovered at runtime rather than from a pre-defined path. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to the user to install the Bun runtime using a piped-to-shell command (
curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash). While this targets a well-known service, the installation pattern involves executing a remote script directly. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The uninstall feature utilizes the
Bashtool to perform several system-level actions, including the removal of plugin directories viarm -rf. While intended for cleanup, this demonstrates the skill's ability to perform significant file system modifications. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests results from external MCP tools and is commanded to display them verbatim, bypassing typical agent summarization. This creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the tool output contains malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Results from
mcp__claude_buddy__*tools (found in SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None; the skill explicitly forbids paraphrasing or altering the tool output.
- Capability inventory: Access to the
Bashtool for file system operations and command execution (found in SKILL.md). - Sanitization: None; raw tool output is relayed to the user.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://bun.sh/install - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata