skill-router
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes metadata (names and descriptions) from other
SKILL.mdfiles found on the local filesystem. This data is interpolated into the agent's context to generate recommendations, which could allow a malicious local skill to influence the router's behavior or mislead the user. - Ingestion points: The
scripts/list_skills.pyscript reads the frontmatter of anySKILL.mdfile located in~/.agents/skills, project-specific.agents/skillsdirectories, or paths specified in theAGENT_SKILLS_ROOTenvironment variable. - Boundary markers: The response format in
SKILL.mduses basic delimiters for candidate listing but lacks explicit instructions for the agent to ignore or sanitize instructions potentially embedded within those external descriptions. - Capability inventory: The skill facilitates the discovery and sequencing of other agent skills and requires the execution of a local Python script (
scripts/list_skills.py). - Sanitization: The discovery script performs basic whitespace and quote stripping on metadata values but does not validate or sanitize the content for prompt injection patterns before passing it to the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute a local Python script (
scripts/list_skills.py) to retrieve the list of available skills. - Evidence: The
SKILL.mdfile explicitly mentions runningscripts/list_skills.py --jsonto identify skill names and descriptions from the filesystem.
Audit Metadata