oss-contribution-research
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 19, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to clone external repositories and execute their local test suites and linters during the verification gates (referenced in
SKILL.mdGate 10 and Gate 12). This involves executing code from arbitrary, potentially untrusted repositories. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes local tools and scripts, such as a "queue's poster" and "hash helper," which are expected to reside in a separate local clone of a private repository rather than within the skill's own directory (referenced in
SKILL.mdStep 11). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from external sources, which could influence the agent's operations.
- Ingestion points: The agent retrieves issue bodies, comments, and pull request descriptions from arbitrary repositories via the GitHub API (referenced in
SKILL.mdGates 5, 6, and 8). - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instructions to treat external data as untrusted are provided in the prompt logic.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to the
ghCLI for network operations,gitfor filesystem and network operations, and the ability to execute local commands for testing. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from external repository threads.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata