randroid
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCEDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of local binaries such as
vibereview,dot, anddot-html. Inskills/randroid-vibereview/SKILL.md, the instructions explicitly direct the agent to locate and verify these binaries, including a check for unknown symlinks. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
randroid-loopworkflow usesscripts/randroid-loop.shto dynamically invoke thecodex execcommand, launching new model iterations to process tasks. - [PERSISTENCE]: A platform-specific
Stophook is defined inhooks/hooks.jsonand implemented inhooks/stop-hook.sh. This hook intercepts the agent's session exit to re-trigger the loop, maintaining the autonomous process until a completion condition is met. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted data which presents an injection surface.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads external content from GitHub pull request comments (
randroid-address-pr-comments) and project task files stored in.dots/(randroid-loop). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or "ignore" rules to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in PR comments or task descriptions.
- Capability inventory: Across its scripts, the skill can write to the local filesystem, perform git operations (commit, push, merge), and execute shell commands.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of external input from PRs or task ledgers is mentioned, allowing potential malicious instructions in those sources to influence the agent's behavior.
Audit Metadata