skills/randroids-dojo/skills/randroid/Gen Agent Trust Hub

randroid

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCEDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of local binaries such as vibereview, dot, and dot-html. In skills/randroid-vibereview/SKILL.md, the instructions explicitly direct the agent to locate and verify these binaries, including a check for unknown symlinks.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The randroid-loop workflow uses scripts/randroid-loop.sh to dynamically invoke the codex exec command, launching new model iterations to process tasks.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: A platform-specific Stop hook is defined in hooks/hooks.json and implemented in hooks/stop-hook.sh. This hook intercepts the agent's session exit to re-trigger the loop, maintaining the autonomous process until a completion condition is met.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted data which presents an injection surface.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads external content from GitHub pull request comments (randroid-address-pr-comments) and project task files stored in .dots/ (randroid-loop).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or "ignore" rules to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in PR comments or task descriptions.
  • Capability inventory: Across its scripts, the skill can write to the local filesystem, perform git operations (commit, push, merge), and execute shell commands.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of external input from PRs or task ledgers is mentioned, allowing potential malicious instructions in those sources to influence the agent's behavior.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 7, 2026, 04:03 AM