container-bounds
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions require the agent to read and analyze external files in the project scope. This creates a vulnerability where instructions hidden in the analyzed files could potentially override the agent's intended behavior.
- Ingestion points: Step 1 in SKILL.md requires the agent to "Read the files in scope".
- Boundary markers: The skill does not provide any specific delimiters or instructions to the agent to treat the analyzed file content as untrusted data or to ignore instructions within it.
- Capability inventory: The skill relies on the agent's ability to read file contents and generate findings reports.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested code content is mentioned.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill instructions define a custom reporting format that uses security-related terms such as "Severity", "HIGH", and "Block". While these are applied to technical UI animation errors (like infinite loops), the reuse of this terminology could cause confusion with platform-level security assessments.
Audit Metadata