code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from GitHub Pull Request metadata (titles, bodies, and comments) and git diffs, which serves as a potential vector for indirect prompt injection to influence the reviewer sub-agents.
- Ingestion points: SKILL.md (Stage 1) utilizes
gh pr viewandgit diffto gather external content for analysis. - Boundary markers: The skill employs structured templates (subagent-template.md) and specific delimiters (e.g.,
=== BEGIN DIFF ===in cross-model-adversarial-review.sh) to isolate untrusted data. - Capability inventory: Reviewer personas possess read-only access to the local filesystem and GitHub APIs. The orchestrator can apply suggested fixes in interactive mode.
- Sanitization: PR comments and code changes are interpolated into prompts without explicit sanitization or filtering of potential instructional text.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes vendor-supplied Python and shell scripts to manage task orchestration and cross-model AI testing.
- Evidence:
scripts/peer-job-runner.pymanages detached process execution for sub-agents usingsubprocess.Popen, andscripts/cross-model-adversarial-review.shinvokes various AI CLI tools (e.g.,codex,claude,grok). These executions are part of the intended functionality and include ownership checks for temporary files to mitigate multi-user risks.
Audit Metadata