proof
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill exports markdown content from local files and GitHub issues to
https://www.proofeditor.ai. While this is the intended functionality for collaborative review, it involves sending potentially sensitive project data to an external third-party service. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several shell commands via the
Bashtool to interact with the environment and GitHub: gh issue viewandgh issue editfor artifact synchronization.curlfor interacting with the Proof Web API.uuidgenfor generating idempotency keys.mktempandjqfor file processing and synchronization.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches data from the Proof API (
GET /api/agent/{slug}/v3/document) to ingest user comments and document revisions. This data is then used to influence agent decisions and modify local or remote content. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it processes untrusted input from an external collaborative surface:
- Ingestion points: Comments and suggestions are retrieved from
proofeditor.aivia API calls (SKILL.md,references/hitl-review.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters for separating user feedback from the original document content during processing, although the agent is instructed to 'read the comment text' and 'decide how to respond'.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write to the local filesystem (
Writetool) and update GitHub issues (gh issue editviaBash). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of programmatic sanitization or escaping for the content being synced back to the source; the agent relies on its own reasoning to evaluate the validity of comments before applying them.
Audit Metadata