fix
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its handling of untrusted input.\n
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data from the
$ARGUMENTSvariable in Step 1 and project-level configuration files like.fullstack-dev/config.jsonin Step 0.\n - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or specific instructions to the agent to treat the content of the directive as data rather than instructions, nor are there warnings to ignore embedded instructions in the files being read for context.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-privilege capabilities including the
Bashtool for shell command execution and theEditandWritetools for direct file system modification.\n - Sanitization: The skill does not implement sanitization or validation of the directives before applying them to the codebase.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands through the
Bashtool to perform build and verification tasks.\n - In the verification phase (Step 4), the skill runs commands defined in
.fullstack-dev/config.jsonor defaults to common build tools likenpmornpxif no configuration is found.\n - The escalation protocol in
reference/fix-flow.md(Section 6) also usesgit checkoutto revert changes, which involves shell command execution.
Audit Metadata