qa-orchestrator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local files and environment variables to manage test credentials.
- Sensitive file access: The installation script
assets/install.shreads.claude/settings.local.json, which is a configuration file that often contains sensitive MCP server credentials. - Environment file access: The orchestrator is instructed in
SKILL.md(Phase 1) to read.env.qa. This file is used to store application secrets, such asQA_API_KEY,QA_AUTH_TOKEN, and test account passwords as seen in the templatereferences/env-qa.md. - Credential propagation: Secrets retrieved from the environment are passed to sub-agents during Phase 3 of the orchestration process. This increases the risk of data leakage if the sub-agents are influenced by untrusted input.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches and processes data from external platforms, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: In
SKILL.md(Phase 1), the agent fetches pull request metadata (titles, bodies) viamcp__github__get_pull_requestand ticket descriptions viamcp__linear__get_issue. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when providing this external data to sub-agents (e.g., in Phase 3).
- Capability inventory: The orchestrator has significant capabilities, including spawning new agents (via the
Agenttool ormcp__forge__spawn_claude), executing shell commands (Bash), and creating GitHub issues (mcp__github__create_issue). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of the content fetched from GitHub or Linear before it is used to guide agent behavior.
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