qa-orchestrator

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local files and environment variables to manage test credentials.
  • Sensitive file access: The installation script assets/install.sh reads .claude/settings.local.json, which is a configuration file that often contains sensitive MCP server credentials.
  • Environment file access: The orchestrator is instructed in SKILL.md (Phase 1) to read .env.qa. This file is used to store application secrets, such as QA_API_KEY, QA_AUTH_TOKEN, and test account passwords as seen in the template references/env-qa.md.
  • Credential propagation: Secrets retrieved from the environment are passed to sub-agents during Phase 3 of the orchestration process. This increases the risk of data leakage if the sub-agents are influenced by untrusted input.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches and processes data from external platforms, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: In SKILL.md (Phase 1), the agent fetches pull request metadata (titles, bodies) via mcp__github__get_pull_request and ticket descriptions via mcp__linear__get_issue.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when providing this external data to sub-agents (e.g., in Phase 3).
  • Capability inventory: The orchestrator has significant capabilities, including spawning new agents (via the Agent tool or mcp__forge__spawn_claude), executing shell commands (Bash), and creating GitHub issues (mcp__github__create_issue).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of the content fetched from GitHub or Linear before it is used to guide agent behavior.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 17, 2026, 02:56 AM