add-clear
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process the agent's conversation history from
src/memory/working-memory.tsandCLAUDE.mdto perform summarization and fact extraction. This creates a surface where malicious instructions embedded in previous conversation history could attempt to influence the compaction process or future agent behavior when the summary is re-injected as context. - Ingestion points: The agent reads conversation history from
src/memory/working-memory.tsand episodic memory fromCLAUDE.md(as specified in the 'Summarize & Compact Flow' and 'Full Reset Flow'). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when processing the history through the summarization prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
read_fileandwrite_file(SKILL.md) to modify memory files, episodic memory (CLAUDE.md), and potentially interact with a local SQLite database. - Sanitization: There is no mention of filtering or sanitizing the ingested conversation history before it is passed to the summarization and extraction prompts (
prompts/memory/summarizer.toon,prompts/memory/extractor.toon).
Audit Metadata