autogen-development

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 6, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided Python example for a calculation tool utilizes the eval() function to process input strings.
  • Evidence: result = eval(expression) in the calculate function within SKILL.md.
  • Analysis: This creates a dynamic execution vulnerability where any valid Python code passed as the expression will be executed by the interpreter, allowing for host-level compromise if triggered by an agent.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions demonstrate how to enable agents to execute commands directly on the host system using LocalCommandLineCodeExecutor.
  • Evidence: code_executor = LocalCommandLineCodeExecutor(work_dir=\"./workspace\", timeout=60) in SKILL.md.
  • Analysis: Granting an LLM-based agent direct shell access to the host environment is a known risk. Although the skill also mentions Docker as a safer alternative, the inclusion of the local executor pattern without strict guardrails is a security concern.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture facilitates processing external tasks through various agents without defining boundary markers or input sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: team.run(task=...) calls in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: None present in the provided templates to separate task instructions from embedded data.
  • Capability inventory: Includes shell execution (LocalCommandLineCodeExecutor) and Python evaluation (eval).
  • Sanitization: No input validation or escaping logic is shown for tool arguments or task descriptions.
  • Analysis: This setup is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection, where a malicious task or processed data could manipulate the agent's logic or trigger its dangerous tool capabilities.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 6, 2026, 09:02 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — autogen-development