cove
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input or previous conversation history and passes it to secondary agent processes.\n
- Ingestion points: User-supplied text provided via the
/covecommand (Step 1) and the most recent assistant response in the conversation history.\n - Boundary markers: The prompt template for subagents in Step 3 (
Question: <the verification question>) lacks clear structural delimiters (such as XML tags or markdown blocks) or 'ignore instructions' wrappers to prevent the verification question from containing instructions that could manipulate the subagent's logic.\n - Capability inventory: The skill instructs the agent to utilize
invoke_agent(Gemini CLI) or theAgenttool (Claude Code) to execute sub-processes with general-purpose capabilities.\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation, escaping, or filtering of the claims extracted from the draft before they are interpolated into the prompt sent to the subagent.
Audit Metadata