kb-wiki
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
Initoperation inSKILL.mdinstructs the agent to create a directory structure by interpolating a user-provided or confirmed list of categories directly into a shell command:mkdir -p kb/raw/sources kb/raw/assets kb/wiki/{category1} kb/wiki/{category2} .... This pattern is vulnerable to command injection if a category name contains shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,&&,|), allowing for arbitrary code execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) during the
Ingestoperation. The instructions inSKILL.mddirect the agent to read untrusted source documents fromkb/raw/sources/and incorporate their content into the wiki without utilizing boundary markers or providing instructions to ignore embedded commands. This allows malicious source documents to potentially override agent behavior. - Ingestion points: Files located in
kb/raw/sources/as specified inSKILL.mdandassets/schema.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not use delimiters or specify that source content should be treated as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands (via
mkdirand thebunscripts) and perform file system writes (viascripts/lib/kb.tsandscripts/map.ts). - Sanitization: Absent. Source material is read and processed directly by the agent to update the knowledge base.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
QueryandMapoperations inSKILL.mdandscripts/map.tsimplement a feedback loop where AI-synthesized content or connections are automatically filed back into the wiki. This mechanism can facilitate the persistence and propagation of malicious content if the knowledge base has been previously poisoned via an indirect prompt injection attack.
Audit Metadata