docx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The script
scripts/office/unpack.pyuses an unsafe method for extracting Word document archives, which are internally ZIP files. - Evidence: The script calls
zf.extractall(output_path)on user-provided documents without validating that the filenames within the archive are confined to the target directory. - Risk: This vulnerability, known as 'Zip Slip', allows a malicious document to use path traversal sequences (e.g.,
../../) to overwrite sensitive files or install malicious scripts outside the intended extraction path. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill's metadata and licensing information are deceptive regarding its origin and authorship.
- Evidence: The
LICENSE.txtfile and multiple internal code comments claim the skill is the proprietary property of 'Anthropic, PBC', which contradicts the provided author context ofrazoukenni-pixel. - Risk: Impersonating a trusted entity is a common technique used to encourage users to grant high permissions or overlook suspicious behaviors during execution.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill performs runtime compilation and utilizes process injection techniques.
- Evidence:
scripts/office/soffice.pydynamically writes a C source file to a temporary directory and compiles it usinggccto create a shared object (.so). It then usesLD_PRELOADto inject this object into the LibreOffice process. - Evidence:
scripts/accept_changes.pygenerates StarBasic macro XML at runtime to automate document edits through the Office suite's internal scripting engine. - Risk: While used here as a workaround for environment restrictions, runtime compilation and library injection are high-capability behaviors that can be repurposed for unauthorized code execution or persistent backdoors.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection through document parsing.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/office/unpack.pyextracts raw XML andpandocis used to convert documents into text for the agent. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill instructions do not include delimiters or warnings to treat document content as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute system commands, write to the file system, and compile code.
- Sanitization: Absent; content extracted from Word documents is passed to the agent without filtering or sanitization of potential natural language instructions.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata