mcp-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The evaluation scripts (
scripts/evaluation.pyandscripts/connections.py) utilize thestdiotransport mechanism to interact with MCP servers. This involves executing developer-defined CLI commands and arguments to launch local server processes for testing purposes. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references documentation and SDK resources from the official Model Context Protocol organization on GitHub (
github.com/modelcontextprotocol) and its primary domain (modelcontextprotocol.io). These are recognized and trusted sources within the development community. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The testing harness ingests input from evaluation XML files and tool outputs from connected servers. This identifies a potential surface for indirect prompt injection where external data could attempt to influence the agent's logic, a consideration inherent to testing autonomous agents.
- Ingestion points: Questions loaded from XML files in
scripts/evaluation.pyand result data returned by tool calls in the agent loop. - Boundary markers: None; the system prompt provides structural instructions using XML tags for the agent's output, but does not provide explicit delimiters for untrusted input.
- Capability inventory: Execution of local server commands, invocation of tools on connected MCP servers, and network access to the Anthropic API.
- Sanitization: The script processes question text and tool outputs without performing validation or escaping before passing them to the language model context.
Audit Metadata