xlsx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Runtime compilation of C source code and process injection.\n
- Script:
scripts/office/soffice.py\n - Evidence: Contains a hardcoded C source code string (
_SHIM_SOURCE) that is written to a temporary file and compiled into a shared object usinggccat runtime.\n - Evidence: Employs the
LD_PRELOADenvironment variable to inject the resulting library into thesofficeprocess. This is designed to intercept and modify low-level system calls (socket, listen, accept) to bypass system-enforced restrictions on UNIX sockets.\n- [PERSISTENCE]: Modification of local application configuration.\n - Script:
scripts/recalc.py\n - Evidence: Automatically installs a StarBasic macro (
RecalculateAndSave) into the user's LibreOffice configuration directory (e.g.,~/.config/libreoffice/). This configuration persists across sessions and modifies the behavior of the local Office installation.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Execution of system compilers and application binaries.\n - Script:
scripts/office/soffice.py,scripts/recalc.py,scripts/office/validators/redlining.py\n - Evidence: Uses
subprocess.runto executegcc,soffice,git, andtimeoututilities.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Significant attack surface due to document processing capabilities.\n - Ingestion points:
scripts/recalc.pyandscripts/office/unpack.pyprocess external.xlsxand.docxfiles.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed data.\n
- Capability inventory: High-risk capabilities including arbitrary file writes and shell command execution via
subprocess.\n - Sanitization: While the skill correctly uses
defusedxmlto prevent XXE attacks, it does not sanitize content or file paths before they are used in shell commands.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata