session-retro
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an automated feedback loop that is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads the entire conversation history to identify friction, mistakes, and knowledge (SKILL.md, Step 1).
- Boundary markers: There are no markers or instructions defined to prevent the agent from following malicious instructions embedded in the conversation data it is processing.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the authority to write to persistent configuration files like
AGENTS.md,.claude/rules/, andCLAUDE.local.md, and to execute shell commands via thebdtool (SKILL.md, Step 2 and 3). - Sanitization: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to "Auto-apply all findings without asking for per-item approval," removing the human-in-the-loop and allowing injected content to become a permanent part of the environment (SKILL.md, Step 3).
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses extracted content from the conversation to run shell commands (
bd rememberandbd create). If the extracted "finding" contains shell metacharacters or malicious payloads, it could lead to unauthorized command execution within the beads environment (SKILL.md, Step 3).
Audit Metadata