adb-bypass
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/preflight-validation.pyusessubprocess.runwithshell=Trueto execute ADB commands. The device identifier provided via the--deviceCLI flag is interpolated directly into the shell command string (e.g.,full_cmd = f"adb -s {device_id} shell ...") without sanitization or escaping. This allows for arbitrary command execution on the host machine if thedevice_idparameter is maliciously crafted (e.g.,127.0.0.1:5555; touch /tmp/pwned). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from an external source (a connected Android device) via
adb shellcommands such asgetprop,pm list packages, anddf. - Ingestion points:
scripts/preflight-validation.pyreads device properties and package lists;bypass-validation.toonandintegrity-verification.toonperform similar checks via theadb-shellaction. - Boundary markers: None. The outputs from these commands are processed directly as strings.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands via
subprocess.runand write to the local filesystem (e.g.,adb-screen-captureinbypass-validation.toon). - Sanitization: There is no significant sanitization of the data retrieved from the device before it is processed or printed. A malicious device could potentially return crafted property values or package names intended to influence the agent's logic or output.
Audit Metadata