spark-recipe-stakeholder-brief
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external sources, specifically email threads and meeting transcripts, which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's output or behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
spark emails,spark thread, andspark meeting --transcriptas described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the fetched data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses commands to read contacts, email bodies, meeting notes, and event schedules.
- Sanitization: There are no explicit sanitization or filtering steps defined for the external content before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow relies on the execution of multiple
sparkCLI commands to retrieve data. - Evidence: Execution of
spark contacts,spark emails,spark thread,spark meetings,spark meeting,spark events, andspark teaminSKILL.md. - Context: These commands are native to the Spark platform developed by the vendor and are used according to their intended functionality for reading user data.
Audit Metadata