openclaw
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation includes commands for piped installation from the web (e.g.,
curl | bashandiwr | iex). While these target the tool's own domain (openclaw.ai), they represent a pattern of downloading and executing remote code without verification. - Evidence:
curl -fsSL https://openclaw.ai/install.sh | bashinSKILL.mdandreferences/openclaw-overview.md. - Evidence:
iwr -useb https://openclaw.ai/install.ps1 | iexinSKILL.mdandreferences/openclaw-overview.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to design and build workflows and skills, which involves ingesting user requirements and potentially external documentation. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the ingested data contains malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: User requirements, external documentation, and existing
SKILL.mdfiles processed inSKILL.mdandreferences/workflow-engineering.md. - Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt templates.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes CLI tools (
openclaw,clawdhub) and file system access as described inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: The skill includes explicit instructions for the AI to not bypass pairing, sandboxing, or audits, and to avoid storing secrets in prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation describes and encourages the use of various CLI commands for managing agents and skills.
- Evidence:
openclaw onboard --install-daemon,clawdhub install spotify-controller, andopenclaw security audit --deepinSKILL.mdandreferences/openclaw-overview.md.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://openclaw.ai/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata