skill-to-prompt
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external Claude skill files (SKILL.md and reference files) and possesses shell execution capabilities, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads source files from
~/.claude/skills/or a user-provided path in Step 1. - Capability inventory: The skill executes shell commands including
node,npm install, andrmin Step 8 and 9. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit markers or instructions to ignore embedded prompts within the source skill data being processed.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input skill content is mentioned before it is processed into the JSON data for document generation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The conversion workflow involves executing shell commands to manage dependencies, run the document generator, and clean up temporary files.
- Evidence: Step 8 instructs the agent to run
nodeto execute the generator and potentiallynpm installto satisfy dependencies. Step 9 usesrmto delete the temporary JSON file. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches the
docxlibrary from the npm registry to support document generation. - Evidence: Step 8 includes a fallback instruction to run
npm install docxin~/Documentsif the package is missing. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill follows a dynamic execution pattern where it generates a temporary JSON configuration file based on analyzed content and then invokes a Node.js script to process that data.
- Evidence: Step 7 involves writing a JSON file (
[skill-name]-conversion.json) which is then passed as an argument todocx-generator.jsin Step 8.
Audit Metadata