skill-to-prompt

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external Claude skill files (SKILL.md and reference files) and possesses shell execution capabilities, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads source files from ~/.claude/skills/ or a user-provided path in Step 1.
  • Capability inventory: The skill executes shell commands including node, npm install, and rm in Step 8 and 9.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit markers or instructions to ignore embedded prompts within the source skill data being processed.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input skill content is mentioned before it is processed into the JSON data for document generation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The conversion workflow involves executing shell commands to manage dependencies, run the document generator, and clean up temporary files.
  • Evidence: Step 8 instructs the agent to run node to execute the generator and potentially npm install to satisfy dependencies. Step 9 uses rm to delete the temporary JSON file.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches the docx library from the npm registry to support document generation.
  • Evidence: Step 8 includes a fallback instruction to run npm install docx in ~/Documents if the package is missing.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill follows a dynamic execution pattern where it generates a temporary JSON configuration file based on analyzed content and then invokes a Node.js script to process that data.
  • Evidence: Step 7 involves writing a JSON file ([skill-name]-conversion.json) which is then passed as an argument to docx-generator.js in Step 8.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 21, 2026, 11:58 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — skill-to-prompt