skills/realwigu/claude-skills/promote/Gen Agent Trust Hub

promote

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a mechanism for content from MEMORY.md (which contains observations from previous sessions, code, and chats) to be promoted to CLAUDE.md or .claude/rules/, becoming permanent system instructions.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads from MEMORY.md and takes user descriptions to filter and move patterns.
  • Capability inventory: The agent uses grep for searching and has the ability to read/write to the project's root and rule directories.
  • Sanitization: There are no specific instructions for the agent to sanitize or validate the content extracted from memory before it is written to permanent rule files.
  • Boundary markers: The process lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the memory data, allowing potential malicious patterns to be 'enforced' permanently.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using keywords derived from the user's pattern description.
  • Evidence: The command grep -ni "<keywords>" "$MEMORY_DIR/MEMORY.md" in Step 2 directly incorporates user-provided keywords into a shell command. If the agent does not properly escape these keywords, it could lead to command injection.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses internal agent configuration and memory files stored in the user's home directory.
  • Evidence: The skill calculates and accesses paths within $HOME/.claude/projects/ and ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md. While these are necessary for the skill's functionality, they represent access to sensitive agent-specific data and configuration.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 4, 2026, 12:32 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — promote