promote
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a mechanism for content from
MEMORY.md(which contains observations from previous sessions, code, and chats) to be promoted toCLAUDE.mdor.claude/rules/, becoming permanent system instructions. - Ingestion points: The agent reads from
MEMORY.mdand takes user descriptions to filter and move patterns. - Capability inventory: The agent uses
grepfor searching and has the ability to read/write to the project's root and rule directories. - Sanitization: There are no specific instructions for the agent to sanitize or validate the content extracted from memory before it is written to permanent rule files.
- Boundary markers: The process lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the memory data, allowing potential malicious patterns to be 'enforced' permanently.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using keywords derived from the user's pattern description.
- Evidence: The command
grep -ni "<keywords>" "$MEMORY_DIR/MEMORY.md"in Step 2 directly incorporates user-provided keywords into a shell command. If the agent does not properly escape these keywords, it could lead to command injection. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses internal agent configuration and memory files stored in the user's home directory.
- Evidence: The skill calculates and accesses paths within
$HOME/.claude/projects/and~/.claude/CLAUDE.md. While these are necessary for the skill's functionality, they represent access to sensitive agent-specific data and configuration.
Audit Metadata