prompt-engineer-toolkit
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/prompt_tester.pyscript enables the execution of external commands through therun_runnerfunction. The script constructs a shell command by formatting a user-provided template string (--runner-cmd) with prompt and input data. This allows for the execution of arbitrary system commands if the runner configuration or the input data is maliciously crafted. Evidence inscripts/prompt_tester.py: The code usescmd = runner_cmd.format(prompt=prompt, input=case_input)followed bysubprocess.run(shlex.split(cmd), ...). - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the dynamic assembly and execution of shell commands at runtime based on external parameters. The command structure is determined by values passed to the script, which may include untrusted content from test cases or prompt files.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes external prompts and test case data while maintaining shell execution capabilities. 1. Ingestion points:
scripts/prompt_tester.pyandscripts/prompt_versioner.pyingest data from local files, stdin, and CLI arguments. 2. Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not implement specific delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded instructions in the test cases or prompts. 3. Capability inventory:scripts/prompt_tester.pycontains the capability to execute shell commands usingsubprocess.run. 4. Sanitization: Absent. The script lacks sanitization or escaping mechanisms for the prompt and input variables before they are interpolated into the shell command template.
Audit Metadata