senior-ml-engineer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses prompt templates that interpolate untrusted inputs (user text and retrieved context) directly into strings without using robust delimiters or security instructions.
- Ingestion points: Found in
references/llm_integration_guide.md(e.g.,{user_input},{product_context}) andreferences/rag_system_architecture.md(e.g.,{context},{question}). - Boundary markers: Absent; the templates rely on standard headers like 'Context:' and 'Question:', which are easily bypassed by adversarial content.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes scripts for model deployment and orchestration (
scripts/model_deployment_pipeline.py,scripts/rag_system_builder.py) that could be targeted if an agent follows malicious instructions in the retrieved context. - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or escaping logic is applied to the input variables before they are interpolated into the prompt strings.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes local Python scripts designed to automate MLOps workflows which are intended to be executed from the CLI.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdprovides commands to runscripts/model_deployment_pipeline.py,scripts/rag_system_builder.py, andscripts/ml_monitoring_suite.pywith various arguments.
Audit Metadata