abai-autoplus-chatgpt-registration
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to clone a repository from an untrusted source (
https://github.com/asz798838958/freeAgentIdentity.git) and execute its contents using Python and Node.js. This pattern is equivalent to a 'download and execute' attack vector if the repository content is malicious. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation process fetches external scripts and dependencies from GitHub and public registries (NPM, PyPI) that are not within the control of the skill or a trusted organization.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of multiple shell commands to set up the environment, install browser runtimes (
playwright install chromium), and launch a web server (uvicorn main:app). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's architecture involves ingesting untrusted external data, such as email verification codes via IMAP/POP3 and captcha solutions from third-party providers. This creates an attack surface where malicious data could influence the agent's behavior during the automated registration process.
- Ingestion points:
email_provider.get_verification_code(),solve_captcha()results. - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided patterns.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess calls (via Playwright), network operations (via httpx and FastAPI), and file writes (via SQLite/database operations).
- Sanitization: Not explicitly documented; the skill interpolates verification codes directly into the browser automation flow.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata