agency-agents-zh-skill
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs users to clone a repository from an untrusted external source (
https://github.com/jnMetaCode/agency-agents-zh.git) and execute local shell scripts (./scripts/install.sh,./scripts/convert.sh) which can perform arbitrary operations on the host system. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the global installation of a third-party package (
agency-orchestrator) vianpm install -g, introducing external code dependencies that are not from a verified or trusted organization. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions encourage the execution of several shell commands, including
git,npm, and custom binaries (ao), which interact with the file system and external networks to perform multi-agent orchestration tasks. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a broad attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Natural language input to the
ao composecommand and thetaskfields withinworkflow.yamlfiles. - Boundary markers: The provided examples do not demonstrate the use of delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded malicious content within tasks.
- Capability inventory: The agents have the capability to generate code, design architectures, and execute complex multi-step workflows across various departments (engineering, marketing, security).
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the input data before it is processed by the agent personas.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata