agentic-ai-research-agent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a workflow where data retrieved from external tools (Tavily, arXiv, and Wikipedia) is directly interpolated into prompts for the writer and editor agents. This creates a surface where malicious content embedded in research sources could potentially influence the behavior of the agent during the report generation phase.
- Ingestion points: User-provided research prompts in
main.pyand external search results fromtavily_search_tool,arxiv_search_tool, andwikipedia_search_toolinsrc/research_tools.py. - Boundary markers: Absent; search results are interpolated directly into f-strings used for LLM completions.
- Capability inventory: Writing results to a Postgres database, making external API calls to search engines and LLM providers.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of external tool output is performed before it is sent to the LLM.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill contains hardcoded default credentials for a local PostgreSQL database (
postgresql://app:local@127.0.0.1:5432/appdb) in the connection string and environment variable examples. While appropriate for local development and Docker-based tutorials, these should be replaced with secure secrets management for production environments.
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