agentic-harness-engineering
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation guide suggests downloading and piping an installation script for the
uvpackage manager from a well-known service (astral.sh) directly to the shell. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The setup instructions include using
sudoto install thetmuxutility via the Linux package manager. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill evolves its own harness (prompts and tools) based on external datasets and agent traces, which could allow malicious data to influence the agent's core configuration.
- Ingestion points: Ingests execution traces and external benchmark datasets (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: None identified in the documentation for the evolved output.
- Capability inventory: The skill can modify local files, execute code within E2B sandboxes, and perform web searches (SKILL.md).
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the proposed harness edits is described.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The evolution loop dynamically modifies the agent's harness components, including tool implementations and middleware scripts, at runtime (SKILL.md).
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata